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‘We are haunted by the Holocaust precisely because there is reason to say it is unique’​[1]​

From the very beginning of our knowledge of the events that constituted the Holocaust, some historians, social scientists, philosophers, theologians and public intellectuals have argued that it was a unique historical, or even trans-historical, event. The argument is often taken to yield some perplexing, disturbing and unpalatable consequences, such as:

	The Holocaust’s uniqueness entails its unintelligibility. (Some critics take this to be a reductio ad absurdum of the uniqueness thesis, whereas some advocates embrace it.)

	If the Holocaust is unique then nothing like it could happen again, hence nothing can be learnt from its occurrence. (Again, some take this as a reductio of the uniqueness thesis, and some embrace it.)

	The uniqueness thesis can only be sustained by diminishing the moral gravity of other genocides. (Most advocates explicitly disavow any such intention or consequence.)

One of my aims in this paper is to show that these consequences do not, or need not, follow from the uniqueness thesis, appropriately conceived and formulated.
The question of uniqueness is taken by proponents and opponents alike to apply to what was done to Europe’s Jewish population by the German state and its citizenry under the aegis of the officially-designated ‘Final Solution to the Jewish problem’. Other groups of people were attacked genocidally too, but the question of uniqueness is only plausibly asked of what was done to the Jewish population. Even those who denounce the uniqueness thesis do not claim that the Holocaust is not unique but some other historical atrocity is. The question of the Holocaust’s possible uniqueness is indeed a peculiar one, for it has not been asked of any other object of historical or social scientific inquiry. 
In essence, the uniqueness question is about whether the Holocaust is so much unlike anything else in human history that it warrants ‘classification’ as a unique event. Unsurprisingly, there is a lack of clarity and rigor on the appropriate meaning and application of the concept of uniqueness in the non-philosophical contributions to the debate. But there is not much more acuity of reflection on the concept and rigorous application of it in the writings of those philosophers that have addressed the question. I will seek to ameliorate this lack of clarity on the concept of uniqueness and the grounds of its application in the uniqueness thesis. My critical engagement with the literature will therefore be directed mostly at the specifically philosophical contributions, which consist chiefly in the following: Emil Fackenheim​[2]​ affirms the uniqueness thesis, largely on historical grounds. Tom Rockmore​[3]​ also affirms the thesis, but with considerable equivocation. Alan Rosenberg,​[4]​ Bob Brecher,​[5]​ and Norman Geras​[6]​ engage extensively with the non-philosophical scholarly literature, critically expositing and assessing the various claims and counter-claims on the Holocaust’s alleged uniqueness canvassed in it. Avishai Margalit and Gabriel Motzkin,​[7]​ and Raimond Gaita,​[8]​ by contrast, advance independent theses on the Holocaust’s uniqueness with little reference to the wider literature. Each of the foregoing affirms the uniqueness thesis, with the exception of Brecher who argues that the Holocaust was just unprecedented (a view which, as we will see, counts as unique on some interpretations of the appropriate meaning of ‘unique’). 
In order to clarify what the uniqueness question should be about I will critically examine the predominant senses of ‘unique’ that feature in the literature to identify the one most apt for considering the possible uniqueness of the Holocaust. I then work out what it would take for the Holocaust to be unique in the appropriately rigorous sense. It turns out that the key question concerns the relation of the Holocaust to genocide, namely: Was the Holocaust more than, or different from, genocide?

1. The meaning & implications of ‘unique’ in the uniqueness thesis

Before trying to ascertain whether or not the Holocaust is unique we must clarify what is being asserted in the claim that an historical event is unique. I note initially, as have many others,​[9]​ that there is a trivial, Butleresque, sense in which every thing or event is unique just in virtue of being what it is and not something else. There is also the ideographic school of historiography which maintains that all historical phenomena are unique. According to this school, each historical event, process, period or era has its own specific combination of features that differentiates it from all others, thus ‘the historian must study them “in all their concrete individuality’’ ’.​[10]​ The Holocaust would obviously count as unique under this once influential historiography of history, but the uniqueness question would not thereby be settled. For there would still be room for the judgement that, notwithstanding the irreducible concrete individuality of all historical events, the Holocaust stands out as utterly different from all of them. 
Uniqueness in the above sense is about the individuality and distinctiveness of historical events, that is, the set of properties and characteristics that gives each its particular identity. There is a tendency for discussants in the uniqueness debate to slip from talking of the uniqueness of the Holocaust to excogitating merely on what made it the strikingly distinctive event that it undeniably was. Gavriel Rosenfeld​[11]​ explicitly advocates ascertaining the distinctiveness of the Holocaust instead of looking for its uniqueness, because of the ‘ambiguity’ and ‘lack of linguistic clarity’ attaching to the latter concept. But distinctiveness is obviously not a property that is peculiar to the Holocaust, and its identification is what should be sought for all objects of historical and social scientific inquiry.
	Advocates of the Holocaust’s uniqueness do not mean that it was unique merely in virtue of being non-identical with any other event, or in having its own distinctive concrete individuality. Rather, they invoke or allude to more substantial and strict senses of the concept of uniqueness. I have discerned three main substantial senses of ‘unique’ that are operative in the literature, namely, (i) unprecedentedness, (ii) (what I call) kindlessness, and (iii) incomparability. These are frequently conflated and underspecified.

i. Unprecedentedness
The notion of being unprecedented is of an event that surpasses anything coming before it, and is unmatched, unequalled or unparalleled so long as it continues to surpass anything occurring after it. Whereas some philosophers see unprecedentedness as one of the core senses of ‘unique’ in the uniqueness thesis,​[12]​ others view it as a closely related but lesser form of exceptionality than full-blown uniqueness.​[13]​
Unprecedentedness is based primarily on quantitative judgement, such that it is in virtue of its scope, scale, extremity and intensity that the Holocaust is deemed to stand out from anything that went before, or came after, it. Asserting that the Holocaust is unique in this sense means that it is the most extreme or pure instance of its kind, namely, genocide. Thus Rosenberg describes the Holocaust as ‘a unique genocidal event’; Rockmore calls it ‘a unique, unprecedented type of genocide’; and Fackenheim says that whilst the Holocaust is ‘but one case of the class “genocide” ’, it is nonetheless ‘without precedent and, thus far at least, without sequel. It is unique’.​[14]​ 

ii. Kindlessness
The idea of kindlessness is expressed in such locutions as the Holocaust being ‘alone of its kind’, ‘in a class of its own’, or ‘sui generis’.​[15]​ Brecher​[16]​ proposes a further distinction, between something being ‘alone of its kind’ and something that belongs to no ‘class of thing’. He adds that anything necessarily ‘alone of its kind’ thereby belongs to no class of thing, and therefore ‘must be, straightforwardly, unintelligible’.​[17]​ 
In my view, ‘alone of its kind’ and ‘classless’ are not, as Brecher asserts, ‘two different senses of “unique” ’,​[18]​ because there being no class or kind of thing to which X belongs is just what X being ‘alone of its kind’ entails, hence I reject the distinction. The phrase ‘alone of its kind’ looks to me either oxymoronic or pleonastic, so I will henceforth use the term ‘kindless’ in its stead. Moreover, I do not think that kindlessness entails unintelligibility, and will show why shortly, via the example of genocide.
Brecher thinks that all advocates of the uniqueness thesis are committed to the view that the Holocaust is kindless, but some – probably most - are committed only to the Holocaust being unique in the unprecedentedness sense.​[19]​ He also thinks that it follows from kindlessness that there could not be any future kindred event,​[20]​ because ‘a “unique” event were it replicated would turn out not to have been unique after all’.​[21]​ I counter that were an event kindred to the one initially judged unique to occur, this would show not that the earlier judgement was erroneous but that the erstwhile unique event is no longer unique. Thus if the Holocaust is judged to be kindless but subsequently a new event of sufficient kindredness to it occurs, then at that point the Holocaust and the new event become members of a new kind. I have seen no reason given for the belief that if the Holocaust is unique it is so necessarily. Even if one were to think (as some apparently do) that it was an event of supernatural provenance, it would not follow that there can be nothing like it in the future emanating from the same supernatural source. 

iii. Incomparability
The most radical of all the senses of ‘unique’ to feature in the uniqueness debate is the claim that the Holocaust is utterly unlike, and cannot even be compared to, anything else. Incomparability is sometimes taken to be what ‘unique’ entails for the uniqueness thesis. Brecher, for example, asserts that ‘if something is unique then it cannot properly be compared with anything else’, and Rockmore maintains that ‘whatever is unique is by definition utterly unlike  anything else, without common measure...in a word incomparable’.​[22]​ Margalit and Motzkin,​[23]​ on the other hand, take ‘incomparability’, such that ‘the Holocaust cannot be compared either to past or to future events’, to be one of the core ‘possible meanings’ of ‘unique’ for the uniqueness thesis.
I find the idea that the Holocaust cannot be compared to anything else, that it is, in itself, incomparable, downright odd. Unless one has tried to compare the Holocaust to some other prima facie comparable event one is in no position to judge it incomparable. But then, if one has sought to compare the Holocaust to other events in order to establish its incomparability it patently is not incomparable.
However, most of those that advocate the Holocaust’s incomparability are probably concerned not so much with the epistemic contention that it cannot be compared to anything else, but with normative injunction against comparison. They worry that the act of comparing the Holocaust to any other event contributes to its historicisation and relativisation, thereby diminishing its momentousness. Making it an object of comparison, they think, treats it as a means to an end external to itself, even when the aim is to draw important lessons from it. Thus the Holocaust should be related to solely on its own terms, as something that warrants awe, piety and humility for what it is in itself.​[24]​ 
I take it, then, that the ‘incomparability’ sense of uniqueness in epistemic mode denotes not that a putatively incomparable thing literally cannot be compared to anything else, but that it is utterly unlike anything else with which it has been compared. This raises the question: Is something that is kindless ipso facto utterly unlike anything else, as Brecher​[25]​ evidently thinks it is? I think not. For example, one can, I submit, fairly easily conceive there having been a first instance of genocide which was kindless at that time in that it was categorically different from all other kinds of collectively perpetrated and suffered violence, yet not utterly unlike anything else.​[26]​ This first genocide would have consisted in collectively perpetrated and suffered violence, where the component instances of violence were of kinds seen before, yet the event itself would have been categorically different from all others in virtue of its motivating goal and organisational implementation. This example of a possible first instance of genocide also serves to show, pace Brecher, that a kindless event can subsequently become the first member a new kind.

iv. Which sense of ‘unique’ is most apt for the uniqueness thesis?

If the Holocaust is unique in the unprecedented sense that is because it stands out as the purest or most extreme instantiation of its kind (genocide). But it would hold this status in common with all other unprecedented members of their respective kinds, of which there must be many such cases (Rosenberg​[27]​ mentions as examples ‘the Industrial Revolution’ and ‘the atomic bombing of Japan’). Many people probably already think that the Holocaust is the most extreme or pure instance of genocide without knowing anything of the uniqueness debate. Whether the Holocaust is in fact unique in the sense of being unprecedented is an important and vehemently disputed historical question, but it is philosophically unremarkable and conceptually unchallenging. Whether unprecedentedness should itself count as a substantial sense of ‘unique’ or just a closely related but lesser form of exceptionality is a linguistic question that I will not try to resolve. My inclination though (in tune with Brecher and Gaita) is to see unprecedentedness as a closely related but distinct concept from that of full-blown uniqueness. The philosophically interesting and conceptually challenging question is whether the Holocaust is unique in a more substantial and strict sense of ‘unique’ than unprecedentedness, namely, that of kindlessness or incomparability.
If the Holocaust is incomparable (utterly unlike anything else) there will be insurmountable epistemic barriers to its bare comprehensibility. For in order to have knowledge of something we must be able to place that thing under general categories, concepts, rules, laws, schemas, etc. As Rolf Gruner​[28]​ puts it, ‘not only could that which had nothing in common with anything else not be described and communicated (and also not be understood and explained), it could not even be known, conceived or apprehended.’ So if the Holocaust is utterly unlike anything else it would be recalcitrant to all modes of historical or social scientific description, explanation or interpretation. But the sheer amount and quality of factual, theoretical, explanatory and interpretive knowledge and description furnished by historical and social scientific inquiry into the Holocaust militates against such epistemic pessimism. Moreover, if it is incomprehensible and unrepresentable tout court, how could we even have a conception of it as a something that we cannot know or represent? Would we not simply fail to identify it at all?
Brecher​[29]​ says that all proponents of the Holocaust’s uniqueness maintain that it is incomparable, and thus ‘quite unlike anything else...not even any other genocide’, but this clearly is not the case (see previous points about kindlessness and notes 19 and 20). Elie Wiesel​[30]​ insists that the Holocaust ‘transcends history’, and other public figures have expressed similar views. Fackenheim​[31]​ asserts that ‘Auschwitz was a kingdom not of this world’, but in his next sentence qualifies this with ‘...But the Holocaust took place in our world’. Gaita also finds ‘reason to speak of the Holocaust as mysterious, outside of history, and forever destined to defeat our attempts to understand it’, but then adds ‘it remains unclear whether they [the reasons in question] fully justify the claim that the Holocaust is mysterious and beyond understanding’.​[32]​ These seemingly equivocal statements are best read not as literal propositions on the metaphysical status of the events and our epistemic access to them, but rather as emotive expressions of an attitude of incomprehension that such events actually occurred. It is an attitude that I have myself frequently experienced when contemplating the facts of the Holocaust. Nevertheless, I know of no academic historian, social scientist, or philosopher that argues unequivocally for literal incomparability with all its attendant metaphysical and epistemic conundrums. 
This leaves the idea of kindlessness as the only conceptually interesting and challenging sense of ‘unique’ for the uniqueness thesis. Being unique in this sense is exceedingly rare, there being very few other things that fail to fit any existing kind (the ideas of God and the Big Bang being the only ones that come readily to mind). If the question of the Holocaust’s uniqueness were only about whether it was unprecedented it would not have taken on the philosophical dimensions that it has. If, on the other hand, the question is about whether the Holocaust is strictly incomparable (utterly unlike anything else), then it is easily dismissed on historical grounds, and raises too much of an epistemic conundrum to be taken at face value. Only if the question of the Holocaust’s uniqueness is about its possible kindlessness, I contend, is it philosophically and conceptually challenging, and a genuinely open question. Moreover, this sense of uniqueness is not grounded in exclusive normative evaluation, hence the invidious comparison consequence that attaches to judgments of unprecedentedness is avoided, or lessened.
But it might well be objected:​[33]​ The Holocaust (unlike God and the Big Bang) surely fits into many different kinds, such as, for example: historical event; antisemetic persecution; State-sanctioned atrocity; mass murder; and, of course, genocide. This being so, the Holocaust is palpably not kindless. But the objection is also true of an event that is paradigmatically categorised as murder, which belongs also to the wider kinds historical event; callous treatment of a human being; discharging a firearm; etc. The kind murder picks out an act’s legal and moral qualities, and since these are the ones of greatest practical significance and resonance the kind murder furnishes the description of the act that takes overriding precedence over other possible categorisations. In most contexts, referring to the act in question as anything other than murder will stand out as a falsification or obfuscation. The description murder identifies the essence of the event, whereas the descriptions historical event, discharging a firearm, etc., whilst being true predications of it, do not capture its essence. What is the essence of the Holocaust? Genocide is surely its default highest order categorisation. Hardly anyone - Holocaust deniers apart – would deny that the Holocaust was at least, or did constitutively include, genocide. In order to establish the Holocaust’s kindlessness then, one has to show that it transcends the kind genocide.
The question of whether the Holocaust is kindless does not contemplate the possibility that ‘it’, in its entirety, including all its component events, actions, processes, structures, etc., escapes categorisation under all existing descriptive kinds; that is patently untenable. What the question ponders rather, is whether there is a core feature, property or aspect of it that makes it transcend the kind genocide. If there is, one might think that this licenses only the conclusion that there is a (kindlessly) unique aspect to the Holocaust, not that the Holocaust itself is unique. In his earlier article, Gaita moots the possibility that ‘there is reason to distinguish between genocide and the essence of the Holocaust’, but in the later article drops reference to the Holocaust’s essence, speaking instead of its (three) uniqueness-conferring aspects.​[34]​ But I think this may be an unnecessary concession. Rape is not properly conceived as ‘sexual intercourse with the particular aspect of there being no consent given by one of the parties’; its essence is the unilateral infliction of a sexual act on someone against their will. Likewise, genocide is not just mass murder aggravated by religious, racial, ethnic, or national hatred (as will be illustrated in the following section). If it were, there would be no need for the specific concept genocide. The question of the Holocaust’s uniqueness in the kindlessness sense is whether there is anything that makes it more than or different from genocide in the way that genocide is more than and different from mass murder and racial, etc. persecution, and the way that rape is more than and different from sexual intercourse. I proceed to examine whether this is the case after bringing to the fore the categorical singularity of genocide.


2. The categorical singularity of genocide

By the time that the conceptualisation of genocide had become widely disseminated, following Raphael Lemkin’s naming of it in 1944,​[35]​ there had been at least two acknowledged paradigmatic instances of it (the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust). Thus there was no opportunity for discussion on the possible uniqueness of genocide. But there could well have been such a discussion, had there been only one recognised instance of it at the time of its conceptualisation. The concept of genocide was and remains strikingly new, yet its categorical singularity is widely underappreciated.
	Both in academic and popular discourse, ‘genocide’ is invariably taken to mean the large-scale killing of people that belong to, and because they belong to, a particular race, ethnicity, religion or nationality.​[36]​ But this description fails to get at what is categorically peculiar to genocide because it does not distinguish genocide from racially aggravated mass murder. The proper meaning of ‘genocide’, I contend, is to be read literally from its etymology, as the killing of a kind of people, and not, as the received conception has it, as the killing of very many people of a particular kind.​[37]​ The mass killing of people of a social kind​[38]​ is just the most expeditious means of pursuing the end of expunging that (Platonically conceived) kind in itself.​[39]​ Typically, the ideas that inspire genocide attribute pernicious or noxious properties to the targeted kind itself, the perceived threat of which supposedly transcends that presented by its members, qua individuals. These properties may be thought to be intrinsic to the ‘blood’, ‘race’ ‘culture’, or ‘nationality’ that is carried and transmitted by the members of the kind in question. 
The idea of killing a kind of people as such is manifestly very peculiar, both in terms of the megalomania in wanting to do so and the logistical obstacles to its realisation. We are familiar with the idea of kinds of plant or animal species becoming extinct through the unintended consequences of human practices, but the idea of wanting, and setting out, deliberately to destroy a kind of human being is something else. Indeed, it has recently been suggested that the contemplated destruction of the few remaining samples of the smallpox virus (kept in secure laboratory freezers in the US and Russia), were it to go ahead, would be the first ‘deliberate extinction of another species’.​[40]​ Thanks to the successful campaigns of the World Health Organization, smallpox disease has effectively been eradicated and the few remaining samples of the virus pose no threat to human health. So the desire that these remnants be destroyed aims at extinguishing the kind itself. It is motivated by the aim of permanently removing the possibility of there being any such disease-inducing effects as the virus is capable of exercising on human beings. Thus the deliberate destruction of a kind in itself (even a kind made up of such ‘an execrable creature’ as the smallpox virus​[41]​) is of categorically different existential, and perhaps moral, significance to the destruction of any number of individuals belonging to that kind.
Nearly all of those philosophers that have written on the concept and practice of genocide reject or eschew the literal reading of ‘genocide’ as the killing of a kind of people.​[42]​ They advance instead individualist conceptions of the object of genocide, according to which the victim cannot be the kind itself but can only be individual members of that kind, who are attacked and suffer because of their membership of it. For it seems incredible that such non-organic, artefactual, things as kinds, or groups, as such, are eligible to suffer death. But the phenomenon of species extinction can serve as a perspicuous rebuttal of this individualist sensibility. It is hard to put one’s finger on exactly what is bad about species extinction, but that it is bad and constitutes a loss of considerable intrinsic value is a widely held intuition. Indeed, the proposition that it is wrong to cause or allow the extinction of a species (viruses excepted) is hardly even controversial. Most people think that this is wrong, whereas most do not think it wrong to kill large numbers of individual animals for legitimate human uses. Given that the extinction of a species is commonly seen as a serious moral loss, I do not see why there should be resistance to the literal interpretation of ‘genocide’. Species extinction is the death of a (supposedly) ‘natural kind’ of animal; genocide is the killing of a social kind (often conceived by the perpetrator, at least, as a natural kind) of people.
However, whereas most people believe that animal kinds per se have intrinsic moral value whilst their individual members have none, with regard to social kinds and human individuals it is vice versa, or rather that human individuals have much greater value than the social kinds that they constitute. I do not want to challenge the latter belief. My point is that it is the intention to kill a social kind as such that makes genocide categorically singular. However, what makes genocide morally awful is the way in which it is pursued, and the harm it causes is indeed borne by individual members of the targeted kind.​[43]​
I have exposited the categorical singularity of genocide because I wanted to bring into view what it is that makes it different in kind to mass murder, racially aggravated mass murder, and other forms of assault on people and social groups. Reflecting on this difference of kind shows what it would take for the Holocaust to be kindlessly unique. It would have to be as categorically distinct from genocide as genocide is from mass murder and other forms of large-scale violence. 

3. What, if anything, makes the Holocaust more than genocide?

I am now in position to consider whether there really is anything about the Holocaust that justifies ascription of the kindless sense of ‘unique’ to it. I will do this through critical examination of the arguments of the three philosophers that either specify or imply this sense of ‘unique’ in their affirmation of the uniqueness thesis.
	After dismissing the trivial, Butleresque, sense of ‘unique’, Margalit and Motzkin​[44]​ exposit what they take to be its two principal ‘possible meanings’, namely, unprecedentedness and incomparability. They then reject both of these and proceed to argue for the Holocaust’s uniqueness without proposing any alternative sense of ‘unique’ for their thesis. However, given the senses of ‘unique’ that they reject, there is only the kindless sense left.​[45]​ Their thesis is that ‘what is unique about the Holocaust is its particular fusion of collective humiliation and mass destruction’.​[46]​ But they concede that neither the humiliation nor the killing on their own are sufficient for uniqueness: ‘many people have been exterminated throughout history, and many people have been humiliated throughout history, but it is exceedingly rare and maybe unique that a group of people has been both systematically humiliated and systematically killed’.​[47]​ However, the claim that the Holocaust is unique in virtue of the conjunction of two features which separately have been in evidence throughout history is a weak argument for it being kindlessly unique. Moreover, it seems naive to think that no other group of people has suffered both systematic humiliation and systematic killing. Whilst the amount and types of killing and humiliation in the Holocaust stand out in brutal starkness, Margalit and Motzkin offer no reasons for why these features make it more than and different from genocide. Their argument at most supports only the thesis that the Holocaust is unprecedented, or that the nature of the killing and humiliation that they invoke is distinctive of the Holocaust.
Geras explicitly commends the kindless sense of ‘unique’, arguing that the Holocaust is ‘in a class of its own’ because it is ‘worse than other comparable historical phenomena’.​[48]​ It is worse, he says, in virtue of the combination of its four core features, namely: (i) the ‘totality of intent’ that animated it, (ii) being a ‘genocidal project’ pursued as ‘an end in itself’, (iii) the ‘bureaucratisation and industrialisation of killing’ deployed, and (iv) the ‘spiritual murder’ perpetrated (through ‘depersonalisation, humiliation, degradation and cruelty’).​[49]​ But the criterion (morally) ‘worse than’ is fitted only to judge unprecedentedness, not kindlessness. It is hard to see why features (i)-(iii) should be thought alien to the practice of genocide – pursuing genocide with widespread zealous intent, as an end in itself, using modern methods and techniques of slaughter, does not make the event super-genocidal, though it may well make it an unprecedented genocide. Under heading (iv) ‘spiritual murder’, Geras​[50]​ talks of ‘brutalities that were surplus even to the aims of genocide’. However, many non-genocidal killings are also committed with a brutality that is surplus to the perpetrator’s aim of destroying their victim, but that gives no reason to categorise such acts under a kind other than murder, albeit perhaps a shockingly heinous, sadistic, or depraved murder. 
Gaita postulates that there is an ‘aspect of the Holocaust, which was arguably different from and even worse than genocide’. ​[51]​ This aspect, he suggests, makes the Holocaust unique, in what evidently would be the kindless sense. It inheres, he says, in the ‘atrocities... that occurred in the death camps’.​[52]​ I agree with Gaita that the idea and actuality of the death camp is the sine qua non of the judgement that the Holocaust was unique. The death camps accounted for around half of the total six million victims killed, the other half being killed by more ‘conventional’ methods such as shooting, starvation, disease and slave-like labour, in ghettos and concentration camps. Nevertheless, if one counterfactually imagines the death camps away, then, whilst the remaining three million deaths would still count as a paradigmatic instance of genocide, I do not think that they would occasion the uniqueness claim. This is not to say that the claim for uniqueness can be sustained by reference to the death camps alone, for they only came about and functioned via the politically driven and civilly administered and enacted programme of genocide. They were, however, the teleological consummation of this genocidal programme.
But why and how might the death camps make the Holocaust something more than and different from genocide? Gaita insists that they were not just prodigiously voracious killing facilities, which is how they are conventionally depicted. Viewed thus, he says, they would just be an unprecedented and currently unmatched means of committing genocide. This depiction, Gaita maintains, obscures the uniqueness of the evil that the death camps embodied. ‘Something even more terrible than genocide was being committed’ in the death camps, he says, which was ‘an evil different from genocide in even its purest form’.​[53]​ However, Gaita does not say much about what this ‘something’ was, and what makes it different from and worse than genocide. He just says that ‘there occurred in them [the death camps] an assault on the preciousness of individual human beings of a kind never seen before’.​[54]​ 
It is not clear to me whether he means by this that the preciousness of human individuality as such was uniquely assaulted through what was done to the victims of the death camps, or that the actual victims of the death camps suffered a unique kind of assault on their preciousness as individual human beings. On the first interpretation, what was done in the death camps caused a diminution of the preciousness (or diminution in recognition of the preciousness) of all human beings subsequent to those events.​[55]​ This interpretation could, I think, give grounds for identifying harm and evil that is of a different kind to that ensuing from genocide (notwithstanding the fact that genocide itself is categorised as a crime against humanity). But it is very unlikely that any such diminution of preciousness or its recognition has in fact been brought about in this way, and hard to think of what would count as evidence for it. Moreover, even if such an effect has occurred, there is no reason to attribute its cause solely to the death camps in isolation from all other instances of mass violence and killing in the twentieth century. 
The more plausible interpretation of Gaita’s claim is that the victims of the death camps suffered a unique form of assault on their preciousness as individual human beings. In which case, this assault must either have been inflicted (i) separately from and in addition to the genocidal purpose that their killing served (as someone might be raped as well as killed), or (ii) through the way that the genocide was committed, in the course of that process. If (i), the assault must have taken the form of cruelty, degradation, or humiliation, that is, non-lethal assaults on the person. Of course, such assaults were widespread, but it is not clear that they are intrinsic to the Holocaust, whereas the ‘industrial’ killing of the death camps surely is. Moreover, cruelty, degradation, and humiliation are common features of many, probably most, other instances of collective violence and genocidal killing. The particular acts of cruelty, degradation, and humiliation perpetrated in the Holocaust were certainly strikingly peculiar, and highly distinctive of it, as adverted to by Margalit and Motzkin, and Geras, but were not different in kind to those perpetrated and suffered elsewhere.
Thus I think that the more plausible candidate for the ‘evil different from and worse than genocide’ is (ii), something about the way that genocide was pursued via the death camps. There are some striking features of the way that the death camps operated as vehicles of genocide. Two stand out with particular prominence. 
First, the purpose of the death camp was deliberately obscured from newly arriving victims, the large majority of whom were dispatched to the gas chamber upon arrival. The actual function of the death camp was hidden by the elaborate deception of being constructed and staffed in such a way as to make arrivals believe that they were being ushered into a changing room. The most infamous of all the deceptions was that the gas chamber was rigged out to look like a shower room until poison gas pellets were dropped into it. We know from witness testimony that death was slow, agonising and terrifying, with the pyramid-shaped mound of corpses reflecting the desperate efforts of the fittest to escape the gas.
Secondly, the death camps were minimally staffed by German personnel. Most of the ‘dirty work’ of shepherding victims to the gas chamber, shaving their hair, extracting gold from teeth, confiscating spectacles, prosthetic limbs, etc., removing bodies from the gas chamber and disposing of them in the crematoria, was done by teams of Jewish captives known as the Sonderkommando (the creation of which Primo Levi considered to be the German regime’s ‘most demonic crime’​[56]​). 
These features reveal the disturbing fact that the (albeit coerced) ‘cooperation’ and ‘complicity’ of the victims was a material factor in the genocide’s modus operandi.​[57]​ However, we are still faced with the question of why these strikingly distinctive features of the way in which the death camps functioned (or indeed others that could be invoked) should be thought to make what took place in them super-genocidal. Certainly, these distinctive features are fiendishly ingenious and uncannily disturbing. It might be said that they were superfluous to the German state’s genocidal aims, demonically going beyond what was necessary to pursue the genocide. But considering the regime’s limitation of resources, the creation and organisation of the death camps was perfectly rational in relation to its genocidal aim, as has been forcefully argued by Zygmunt Bauman.​[58]​ Indeed, one might well think that the intention to commit genocide against a group so large, diverse, dispersed and locally assimilated as Europe’s Jewish populations were requires exactly what the death camps were, that is, a productive and efficient way of killing and disposing of vast numbers of people. 
It is theoretically possible for a murderous genocide to be planned and executed in such a way as to inflict no more cruelty, degradation and humiliation than unavoidably attaches to the mass killing of human beings. But when (as it invariably does) the motivation for genocide consists in fear, hatred, contempt and disgust towards what perpetrators believe to be the pernicious properties and powers of the targeted social kind, juxtaposed with a vivid sense of their own righteousness, they inevitably hold a dismissive attitude towards the individuals that personify it. Thus perpetrators have no reason to make genocide as ‘humane’ as they could. On the contrary, the means employed to commit genocide in the Holocaust were developed with a view to making it more ‘humane’ for the perpetrators.​[59]​ So, awful though the conception, design, function, and operation of the death camps were, it is hard to see why what was done in them should make the Holocaust something more than or different from genocide. The evil perpetrated in the death camps seems on the contrary to be fully commensurate with genocide of the scope, scale, purity, completeness and intensity of purpose of the Holocaust. 







Although I conclude that the Holocaust is not essentially more than or different from genocide, I do believe that it is the most extreme, pure and quintessential instance of genocide, and thus either unique in the sense of unprecedentedness, or just unprecedented. It is largely due to its occurrence that we have the concept of genocide at all. The attempt to destroy the social kind Jewishness, directed and organised by the German state and willingly enacted by every section of its citizenry, was a societal-wide national project. Its scope, scale, depth, extremity, intensity, purity of purpose, institutional ingenuity, technological sophistication, and the mass- participation and support in its perpetration, are astounding. The combination of the ‘banality’ of character and motivation of many of the actors, alongside the ‘radical’ evil resulting from their actions is utterly perplexing and evinces what Gaita​[60]​ calls an ‘incredulous awe’. 
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